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 This study examines the relationship of perceived corruption in Ukraine and the factors 
that influence that perception. In particular, this paper investigates the idea that an influential 
Russian presence affects the perception of governmental corruption amongst Ukrainian business 
owners and managers. An Ordered Logistic Regression is utilized to estimate how business 
ownership and business environment characteristics affect the likelihood of how severely 
corruption is perceived. Using a sample of 1207 respondents from the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) obtained by the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), a combination of quantitative and qualitative variables is utilized. 
Speaking Russian at work in Ukraine has a weak but positive statistically significant effect on 
the severity of perceived corruption within the government. Working in industries such as 
chemical, construction, wholesale, and transportation has a strong statistically significant impact 
on the severity of perceived corruption of respondents within these sectors. In comparison, 
working in white-collar industries such as electronics and information technology shows no 
evidence of affecting perception of corruption. In addition, the percentage of a business that is 
foreign-owned affects the likelihood of how severely corruption is perceived, while the size of a 
business and the size of the city in which it is located have no effect. This paper also evaluates 
how these coefficients change when looking at Russian-speaking Ukrainians versus Ukrainian-
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Corruption is the unlawful or immoral misuse of public resources by government officials 
for personal or illegal gain. Although the meaning of corruption can vary greatly from institution 
to institution or person to person, corruption has generally been looked upon as a detriment to the 
economy and society as a whole. Corruption can take many forms such as bribery, extortion, 
time-wasting, dishonesty, or self-service to misuse public resources. Due to the difficulty in 
measuring and acquiring data on such an illicit topic, this paper examines the perception of 
corruption as a proxy for corruption. 
In addition to the obvious moral concerns, it is important to eliminate the perception of 
corruption within a country’s government in order to increase the trust of its citizens and of 
foreign governments. Diplomacy and politics appear more predictable and stable both within 
domestic political parties and with foreign governments with the reduction of perceived 
corruption. 
In order to begin the process of eliminating perceived corruption we must first understand 
its causes. When examining Ukraine, we must consider the presence of Russian influence as a 
determinant of perceived corruption of Ukraine’s government. This influence is embedded 
within the psyche of Ukrainian culture today through media, economics, and politics. In addition 
to navigating the Russian influence, Ukraine has had to manage the tumultuous changes within 
its own history; ranging from the times of the Crimean Hordes, to the Kievan Rus, to the 
incorporation into the U.S.S.R and its return to independence. The dynamic between Russia and 
Ukraine has created a tense and uncertain future for the latter as many of its politicians and 
policymakers are caught between Western and Russian values.  
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According to Transparency International, a global organization that measures and ranks 
national perceived corruption, in 2014 Ukraine had the 33rd highest perception of corruption out 
of 174 participating countries. Within that same index, it only scored one point lower (26) on a 
hundred-point scale than its former socialist republic sister Russia (27). Figure 1 shows how 
Ukraine’s perception of corruption has changed from 2008 to 2014, illustrating that Ukraine has 
had very little success in changing its perceived corruption over those 7 years. The lack of 
improvement in this low rating suggests that market and government reforms have failed to 
become more transparent. Other former socialist republics of the U.S.S.R such as Moldova, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia all ranked better than Ukraine in perceived corruption 
in 2014. In addition to having similar government and economic structures when compared to 
these countries, Ukraine also has several unique factors beneficial to economic growth, such as 
proximity to the European Union, easy access to the Mediterranean Sea through the Black Sea 
and Bosporus Sea, and its former role as the U.S.S.R industrial zone. This raises the question as 
to why Ukraine, despite these seemingly beneficial factors, has had such poor economic growth. 
According to the World Bank, the annual GDP per capita growth rates in Ukraine for 2012, 
2013, and 2014 were 0.239%, -0.027%, and -6.553% respectively.  The high perception of 
corruption in Ukraine as reported by Transparency International may suggest that government 







Figure 1: Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2008-2014 
Year Score (Base 100, 100 is no 
perceived corruption) 
Year over Year % change in 
score 
2008 25 - 
2009 22 -12% 
2010 24 9.09% 
2011 23 -4.17% 
2012 26 13.04% 
2013 25 -3.85% 
2014 26 4% 
Source: Transparency.org  
 
In recent history, Ukraine has experienced notable governmental change with the 
intention to establish growth in its economy. Whitmore (2014) notes that Ukraine has changed or 
readopted its constitution several times since its independence from the U.S.S.R in 1991. While a 
country going through such a radical government transition would be expected to make political 
and policy changes, too many constitutional changes in a very short time period can create 
uncertainty and unpredictability. Unpredictability continues to be a factor in society as Ukraine 
moves away from the policies of its former centralized government and transitions into an open-
market economy. Since Ukraine gained independence from the U.S.S.R, the westernization of its 
economy after years of socialism has caused the GDP per capita to drop by over 50%.1 Figure 2 
shows Ukraine’s GDP per capita from 1991 to 2014. The huge decline and slow recovery of 
GDP per capita has caused economic unpredictability and civil unrest. As Ukraine looks to shed 
the remnants of its planned economy and grow its four-digit U.S. dollar GDP per capita, it is 
imperative for policy-makers to reduce this uncertainty and unpredictability. Some Ukrainians 
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believe that realigning their interests with Russia will best serve their country and bring forward 
economic stability. This is illustrated by the ongoing rebellion in Luhansk and Donetsk backed 
by pro-Russian rebels. Other Ukrainians feel that closer economic ties with Europe will help 
repair their stagnating economy. In 2013, pro-European Ukrainians took to the streets in the 
Maidan Square protest to display their dissatisfaction with the pro-Russian government and 
former President Yanukovych’s intention to solidify their dependence on Russia; this ultimately 
forced him from office. Soon after, Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014 claiming that it 
was the will of the Russian speakers to return to Russia’s sovereignty. These events fueled the 
discord amongst the pro-Russian and pro-European Ukrainians. Such conflicts have deep-rooted 
complexities that delve into Ukraine’s history, culture, geography and diplomacy that can affect 
how the citizens feel their government is performing. Rational citizens then react according to 
how they expect their government and economy to perform. Therefore, the perception of 
corruption in this time of uncertainty is vital for determining Ukraine’s short-term economic 
growth.  
Figure 2: GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD 
 
Source: World Bank 
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The perception of corruption can have lasting effects on a country’s government, varying 
from country to country, but this study aims to specifically examine which factors influence that 
perceived corruption within Ukrainian businesses. Specifically, we use individual level data 
obtained by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to identify which factors 
contribute to business managers’ perception of corruption in the Ukrainian government. 
Although the data acquired is from a niche sample of the population, it gives us the ability to 
examine perceived corruption from those in the business sector. Thus, the main focus of this 
paper is to determine whether Russian influence is among one of the many factors that alter 
one’s perception of corruption.  
As it is difficult to directly account for Russia’s influence on the Ukrainian society, we 
make the assumption that those who speak Russian are more likely to be influenced by Russian 
culture, media, politics, and ideals. There has been evidence demonstrating that those who speak 
Russian abroad will be a focus of Russian foreign policy. President Putin of Russia has publicly 
stated that it is his duty to protect Russian speakers no matter where they reside. This is one of 
the ways he justified Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Such actions do not guarantee that Russian 
speakers are influenced by Russia; however, Russian is spoken throughout Ukraine as one of its 
official languages. Therefore, this study uses Russian language as a proxy for Russian influence.  
The first section of the paper reviews the previous literature on perceived corruption and 
how it ties into economic growth.  Section two explains the data and type of test that is used in 
this study. Section three derives an equation from previous studies. Section four takes a brief 
look at the raw results of the paper. Section five contains an analysis of the results and what steps 




I. Previous Literature 
The effect corruption has on an economy has been studied with ambiguous findings. 
Mauro (1995) finds evidence that a more efficient bureaucracy tends to lead to an increase in 
investment inflows.  Mauro created this bureaucratic efficiency index (BI) to standardize how 
well a government performs its duties. Mauro notes that while a low BI score does not 
exclusively mean corruption is the problem, a high amount of corruption can cause a low BI 
score. Levine and Renelt (1992), along with many others such as Root and Ahmed (1979), and 
Borensztein et al. (1997), find that investment inflows such as foreign direct investment (FDI) 
increase economic growth. This growth can occur by eliminating market barriers, incentivizing 
technological growth, and/or allowing the creation of more competition. Mauro’s assessment of 
efficient governments and increased investment flows, paired with the finding that an increased 
investment inflow rate tends to increase economic growth can lead us to conclude that sustained 
levels of corruption can indirectly lower the overall economic growth rate. Research done by 
Azman-Saini et al. (2010) adds that a certain threshold of technology and human development 
must be present in the country for foreign or domestic investment to have a positive impact on 
economic growth. Ukraine is not far behind the West in terms of access to technology; there are 
1.4 mobile telephone subscriptions per citizen, indicating that nearly all of its citizens have 
access to mobile phones, and approximately half its citizens have internet access. However, 
Ukraine’s Human Development Index (HDI) provided by the UN indicates that it may not be at 
the necessary threshold as it ranks 84th out of 194 countries and has consistently stayed near this 
level since 1991.2 Given this mediocre level of HDI, Ukraine has incentives to increase its 
                                                 
2
 Source: Jahan, Selim. “Human Development Reports: Ukraine.” 2014 Human Development Report,  
 United Nations Development Programme, 2015, hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/UKR# 
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overall human development in order to attract more investment as well as increase the marginal 
benefit of those investments. Figure 3 shows the change in payments of FDI into Ukraine, GDP 
per capita growth, and change in perceived corruption from 2008-2014. Ukraine’s geopolitical 
affairs have caused volatile shifts in FDI while GDP per capita and perceived corruption have 
barely fluctuated. A potential solution to a more reliable inflow of FDI is to increase its BI by 
reducing the amount of perceived corruption in its government. 
Figure 3: Percentage Change in FDI, GDP per capita, Corruption 
 
Source: World Bank, Transparency International. 
 
In order to get a more complete picture of corruption we must acknowledge that in 
certain circumstances corruption may be efficient for a particular institution. Papers from 
Dzhumashev (2014) and Huang (2015) dispute, in part, that corruption always inhibits economic 
growth and in fact find evidence that there are levels of corruption that can be optimal for 
government efficiency. Dzhumashev makes the case for corruption existing in government to the 
extent in which it mitigates complex institutions and serves as a tool to bypass inefficient red 




tape. For example, a business that wants to build infrastructure may pay off a local official in 
order to sidestep building permits and legal building codes required by a slow, ineffective, or 
distant government to formally approve their plans so that it may enter the market more quickly. 
In these instances, it may be economically or bureaucratically efficient to tolerate systematic 
corruption. Corruption can be used to lessen the weight of heavy-handed governments that have 
grown too large to operate efficiently. Huang used cross-country analysis to determine that even 
a country as developed and democratic as South Korea can become more bureaucratically 
efficient with a sustained level of corruption. This “greasing the wheels” example runs counter to 
the argument that all corruption should be eliminated for the benefit of economic efficiency.  
Outside of the institutional realm, corruption can be viewed as a problem that moral 
citizens would like to eliminate on principle. If left unchecked within an institution, corruption 
can become pervasive and accepted over time. In a two-player individual pay off game, Ghatak 
and Iyengar (2014) suggest corrupt behavior by one player can influence others to act corruptly. 
This leads to a feedback effect, whereby initial corruption or perceived corruption continues to 
thrive or even grow. While in reality, there are often more than two players and a wide variety of 
different types of “games”.  Ghatak’s and Iyengar’s findings can still apply by the same process 
and reasoning as the two-player pay off game. In a government that has allowed corrupt officials 
to work in public office, corruption could become a phenomenon or possibly increase in severity 
if steps to deter it are not put into place. Morris (2006) investigates whether or not there is a 
variation in perceived corruption within Mexican states. Our paper follows a similar approach in 
the context of Ukraine.  His findings show that traditional macroeconomic characteristics such as 
income growth, economic development, and federal direct investment as well as individual 
characteristics such as schooling, ethnicity, and interpersonal trust did not alter the perception of 
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corruption over a span of three years. He does, however, find that the perception of corruption in 
previous years was significant in determining the perception of corruption in later years. This 
empirical finding from Morris agrees with the theoretical work of Ghatak and Iyengar suggesting 
that previously perceived corruption can influence future perceptions.  
Corrupt behavior can coerce others into acting corruptly if there is a system in place that 
allows it to occur and continue. Levine and Satarov (2000) examine how institutional norms and 
organizational and political culture allow corruption to exist in Russia. They suggest that implicit 
attitudes and understandings exist amongst public officials that are conducive to allowing 
corruption and bribery to take place. They also illustrate the complexities of how politicians 
insert themselves into private businesses, creating a dynamic that often mixes political 
backchanneling with business deals. For example, a business that requires recurring drilling 
permits may build a relationship with a public official who personally benefits from fast tracking 
drilling permits. This could happen within an institution as well, driven by a combination of the 
institution’s lack of law enforcement and employees who do not want to disrupt the acceptable 
status quo.  During a short-term period, whether in game theory or reality, it’s possible that 
corrupt behavior can create future corrupt behavior purely by influencing others’ actions. 
Without a mechanism or process to address the perpetuation of corruption, this behavior can 
become fully sustained resulting in long-term corruption.  
Shleifer and Vishy (1993) conclude that weak and transitioning central governments are 
more susceptible to costly corruption. They use an example in post-communist Russia where a 
foreigner (non-Russian) who tries to invest in a Russian business has to pay bribes to institutions 
throughout the entire investment process (such as minister of industry, foreign investment office, 
executive branch and so on). This type of corruption reduces incentives for foreigners to invest in 
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that country. A cohesive federal government will be elusive if branches of central government 
act independently and unilaterally. Institutions who act to further their own self-interest without 
transparency or interference from other agencies allow bribery and corruption to thrive. This is 
evident in Ukraine where the federal government is in the midst of a slow transition and 
corruption still appears to be a problem. The corruption and bribery that fuel this process is likely 
to perpetuate corruption until a transitioning government can show it will protect foreign and 
domestic investors. If the government lacks central authority, accountability, and transparency, 
then current corruption can be an indicator of future corruption. 
While it appears that the Ukrainian government has failed to implement proper reforms to 
shift the economy to a more decentralized market, it has created some opportunities for 
entrepreneurship. Businesses could fill the gaps in the economy where the central government 
has failed (Smallbone, Welter, Voytovich, & Egorov 2009).3 When the government begins 
transitioning from a planned economy to an open market it creates a new paradigm. Smallbone et 
al. explains that there is potential for black markets that existed during the planned economy to 
become legitimate and enter into the free market. It is in the nature of change that some 
industries and businesses will adapt to the transition while others will fail or become irrelevant. 
The struggles of some private industries compared to the success of others have the potential to 
create opposing viewpoints among Ukrainians on the business environment and economic 
transition process.  
Along with opportunities for entrepreneurship, economic and government reforms also 
bring new challenges. Blake and Morris (2009) note that with open market reforms and the 
democratization of government, there can be new areas and opportunities for corruption to occur.  
                                                 
3
 For example, a state-run distribution center turned privately owned. 
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They also suggest that a longer and slower reform process may also give rise to corrupt practices. 
As a symptom of a long transition, the demand for accountability and transparency fails to 
adhere as complacency sets in for citizens and institutions, creating a new breeding ground for 
corruption. This is in line with Braguinsky (1996) who suggests that corruption in capitalist 
environments is transitory in that corrupt events ebb and flow as the market and policies catch up 
with the demands of agents. In comparison, a more controlled market or totalitarian environment 
produces long-term corruption that becomes systemic. The logic behind Braguinsky’s finding 
suggests that when an open-market economy demands equilibrium revolving around constantly 
changing factors, those who exhibit corrupt behavior must constantly adapt to hide from the 
procedures, laws, and institutions that evolve with the changing economy. In contrast, a 
totalitarian environment does not encourage change within the government and a planned market 
requires massive policy shifts in order to change the dynamic of the economy. This is conducive 
to long-term corruption, where it can be sustained and does not have a reason to be addressed.  
In addition to identifying systematic factors that contribute to the perception of 
corruption, there are individual factors that may contribute as well. Swamy (2001) ignites a 
debate over gender and corruption during an era where women are still trying to reach equality in 
the majority of the world. He suggests that more women in government office leads to less 
bribery given certain economic conditions. Wangnerud (2011) builds on this premise set by 
Swamy and takes it a step further, showing evidence that women are inherently less corrupt. If 
gender has an effect on corruption, an argument could be made that other implicit individual 





II. Data  
 The data used in this study was provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). The dataset contains information from surveys sent to businesses to get 
an overall measurement of qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the economy. The 
survey used is called the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, also 
referred to as the BEEPS. The BEEPS has been performed in five waves, allowing access to data 
from different time periods. This study uses panel data that combines BEEP IV-V, the two most 
recent waves of the survey that was distributed between 2012 and 2014 and reflects data from 
that time range. BEEPS is an expansive dataset that provides industry level data and gives 
researchers access to information that is obtained from thousands of individual sources. This 
study uses a sample of 1207 survey respondents consisting of business managers and owners in 
Ukraine. 
 The BEEPS diversity and depth of information allows researchers to answer questions 
that have previously been difficult to answer empirically. It contains questions that cover topics 
related to corruption, productivity, demographics, and business environment. In an illicit topic 
such as corruption, the BEEPS provides consistent and standardized data which allows 
researchers to examine corruption with accuracy and consistency. Papers such as De Rosa et al. 
(2010) use the BEEPS to determine the effect of bribes (“bribe tax”) on productivity compared to 
the effect of following the proper channels of government (“time tax”) on productivity. Using 
cross-country analysis, they find that the bribe tax has a negative impact on a country’s 
productivity while the time tax has no effect. They also find the bribe tax is more harmful to 
European Union (EU) countries when compared to non-EU countries. This suggests that 
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economic conditions and macroeconomic policy do in fact affect how corruption impacts the 
economy.  
Blagojevic and Damijan (2013) also use the BEEPS II-IV panel data, which combines 
three waves of BEEPs from 2002-2009, to determine how demographic ownership affects how 
likely a business is to partake in informal bribery. They suggest that foreign-owned businesses 
benefit from bribery more than domestic-owned businesses. Similarly, Bondarev (2014) uses the 
BEEPS II-IV dataset to perform a maximum likelihood regression on an instrumental variable 
for foreign-ownership to find that a relationship exists between foreign-ownership of businesses 
in Ukraine and perceived corruption. 
 
III. Methodology 
 An ordered logistic regression method (Ologit, a procedure in STATA) and a variety of 
factor variables are used to determine the effect of Russia’s influence on the severity of 
perceived corruption of Ukraine’s government. The analysis measures how specific variables 
affect the likelihood of each of the five degrees of corruption, ranging from none (0) to severe 
(4). Appendix I shows the distributions of perceived corruptions from the BEEPS IV-V panel 
data. 
The estimation equation is based on a combination of results from previous studies and 
current events happening in Ukraine. Before assembling the equation, the following statements 
should be considered: 
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1. “Perceived corruption”, the dependent variable in this study, is used as proxy for actual 
corruption. Corruption in its truest form can be incredibly hard to directly measure as it is 
very subjective and abstract.  
2. Although the definition of corruption can vary by respondent, their answers reflect a 
standardized measure of perceived corruption (i.e. none, minor, moderate, major, severe). 
The survey measures the severity of corruption by asking how it affects each 
respondent’s day-to-day business operations.  
3. The perceptions of business owners and managers are assumed to represent how 
corruption impacts the business and economic environment. While this does not best 
represent the full scope of all corruption, it should provide a relatively more precise 
reflection of the economic impacts of perceived corruption.  
4. This paper measures how likely a respondent is to perceive corruption of the Ukrainian 
government on a scale from 0 (none) to 4 (severe). For analysis purposes, this paper 
assumes that the more severely respondents are impacted by corruption, the more likely 
they are to perceive the government as corrupt.  
5. Ukraine has two primary languages; Ukrainian and Russian. The language in which each 
respondent spoke during the survey was recorded as either the local language (Ukrainian) 
or Russian. This information was utilized to obtain the Russian language variable.  In this 
paper the base language is Ukrainian and the dummy variable is set to 1 when a 






This model will build on previous studies to identify which factors affect perceived 
corruption. Our dependent variable, perceived corruption, is measured by severity and answers 
the question “how severe of an obstacle is corruption to your day-to-day operations?” As 
illustrated in consideration #2 from the Methodology section, this survey question provides a 
standardized way to measure respondents’ general assessment of corruption without having 
specific insight on the inner-workings of government.  
-Control Variables 
Dollar et al. (2001) investigates a controversial factor in determining perceived 
corruption: Does the gender of those in public office affect the perceived corruption of that 
office? In this niche area of study, they determined that gender does affect corruption. Their 
cross-country analysis shows that when more women are elected into office there is less 
perceived corruption. Swamy, Knack, Lee, & Azar (2001) reinforces this premise in his findings 
that an increased female presence within the government lowers the incidence of bribery when 
specific economic conditions are met. In a more recent study, Esarey & Chirillo (2013) performs 
cross-country analysis to look at a gender’s impact on corruption and finds that it varies 
depending on an institution’s cultural and social norms. The data utilized in our estimation 
equation does not include the gender of the respondent but does include a dummy variable that 
represents whether females have a stake in the respondent’s business. This dummy variable will 
act as a control for inherent attitudes or perceptions within a business brought about by its female 
owner(s).  In addition to female ownership, a variable to account for the percentage of a business 
that is foreign-owned is used in the estimation equation. If female owners have an impact on 
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perceived corruption due to some inherent quality, then a similar argument can be made for 
foreign owners. 
Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the country’s parliamentary election process has 
changed seven times (Whitmore 2014). As stated in the introduction, Whitmore points out that 
there have been numerous constitutional changes and re-adoptions that have contributed to 
political instability. The BEEPS evaluated the respondent’s answers in relation to how severely 
political instability impacts their day-to-day business operations. This variable, political 
instability, is utilized in the estimation equation. It can be interpreted in a variety of ways and is 
left to the respondent to determine how it affects their business operations. Political instability is 
measured on the same scale as our dependent variable ranging from none (0) to severe (4). 
Taxes are one of the more pervasive factors that can affect an economy. The estimation 
equation includes the perceived effect of tax rates on daily business operations as a control 
variable. This controls for the respondent’s perspective on how mandatory factors such as tax 
rates affect their daily business operations versus subversive factors such as political instability. 
The variable for tax rates is in the same format as our dependent variable. Respondents were 
asked to evaluate how severely tax rates affect their day-to-day business operations and they 
provide an answer ranging from none (0) to severe (4). 
Although Wangnerud (2011) focuses on determining the impact of gender on corruption, 
her model also includes population as a contributing factor in determining the variation of 
corruption. The BEEPS dataset provides a range of population for the city in which a business is 
located. In addition to the geographical population, the estimation equation will also include a 
variable that accounts for the size of the business (number of employees). The use of this 
variable can be viewed in two ways. Firstly, the size of a business may influence the frequency 
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of interactions with public officials and secondly, the size of a business may impact perception of 
how corruption affects an individual within that business.  
The final control variable in this estimation equation is the type of industry in which the 
respondent is employed. The industry variable is included to control for industry-specific 
practices and behaviors that impact its relationship with the Ukrainian government. For example, 
a mining company that regularly needs to obtain licenses for drilling, the food industry that 
interacts with health inspectors annually, or the shipping industry that decides to put its 
headquarters near the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine may all have 
varying levels of government interactions that influence their perceptions of corruption. 
 The equation estimated using maximum likelihood is: 
 corruption = β0 + Χ1 β1+ χ2 β2 + χ3 β3+ χ4 β4+ χ5 β5+ μi  
where the dependent variable is severity of  perceived corruption and βn is the coefficient of its 
corresponding χn variable; Χ1 is a vector of indicator variables that include type of industry, size 
of the city of the business location, the severity of effect of tax rates on business operations, the 
severity of effect of political instability on business operations; χ2 is number of employees a  
business; χ3 is a dummy variable for Russian language, the variable used to determine if there 
exists a Russian influence on corruption; χ4 is a dummy variable for any degree of female 
ownership; χ5 is the percentage of business foreign-owned; and μi is the error term. A list of the 
variables and their statistical means are listed in Table 1. Since ordered logistic regression 
measures likelihood, it measures the change in likelihood relative to a given set of circumstances. 
All of the variables in this paper are formatted so that the data is reported linearly by magnitude 
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or is a dummy, with the exception of industry, which is categorical and all measurements of 
industry are relative to non-specialized manufacturing sector. 
 
IV. Results 
 Table 2 shows initial results. A condition of using this ordered logistic regression 
technique is that it’s output is not interpretable in terms of a specific coefficient’s magnitude and 
direction. However, we can see which variables are statistically significant. Compared to the 
base perceived corruption of a non-specialized manufacturing company, there are a number of 
industries that are statistically more likely to view corruption differently, with construction, 
transportation, and wholesale having a p-value of 0.01 or less. Political instability, tax rates, and 
percentage of foreign ownership are also below the 0.01 p-value. Our main variable, Russian 
language is significant at the 0.10 level. 
In order to determine the variable’s effect on the likelihood of perceived corruption, there 
needs to be a calculation of the average marginal effect (AME). This will create an interpretable 
average effect of each variable across all possible dependent variable outcomes. The AME for all 
control variables can be found in Table 3. The AME in this study is calculated at the means of 
each variable. 
Overall, the Russian language variable has a p-value below 0.10, which is weakly 
significant. It’s average marginal effect is 0.0233. This means that a Russian-speaking 
respondent is 2.33% more likely to report a higher level of corruption in the Ukrainian 
government. Additionally, tax rates and political instability have a strong statistically significant 
and negative effect on the severity of perceived corruption. This indicates that an increase in the 
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level of severity of the effects of tax rate or political instability lowers the likelihood that 
corruption affects their day-to-day business operations. An increase in a level of severity of the 
effects of tax rate and political instability reported by each respondent decreases the likelihood of 
reporting a higher level of corruption by 0.0535 and 0.0785 respectively. 
 Notably, the dummy variable for female ownership is not statistically significant while 
the foreign-ownership variable is significant at the 0.01 level. For every percentage point 
increase in foreign-ownership, it is 0.09% less likely that the respondent will report a higher 
level of corruption. This is notable because it may indicate that environmental factors such as 
where an individual was raised and their cultural upbringing may affect one's expectation of 
corruption, while inherent factors such as gender may not. This result may be specific to Ukraine 
where societal expectations and the institutionalization of women are different than in other 
countries, as Morris (2009) and Wangnerud (2011) pointed out. 
The type of industry a respondent works in impacts their perceived corruption. The most 
statistically significant industries are transportation (-0.1548 AME), chemicals (-0.1380 AME), 
construction (-0.1084 AME), and wholesale (-0.1005 AME). These industries are statistically 
significant in relation to a non-specialized manufacturing business.  
Table 3 also lists the AME of each variable when Russian language is set to 0 and 1. One 
variable that stands out is the percentage of a business that is foreign-owned. When the Russian 
language dummy variable is set to 1, the AME of percentage of business foreign-owned is -
0.0008 while when Russian language is set to 0, the AME is -0.0009. It can be extrapolated that 
the expectations of corruption of those businesses that are foreign-owned may be determined by 
external factors. The upbringing, experience, and morals of foreign business owners may bestow 
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different organizational culture and expectations on their businesses that are independent of 
Russia’s influence on Ukraine. 
In Table 3, there is a notable difference in the AME between Russian speakers and 
Ukrainian speakers when comparing the effect of political instability on perceived corruption. 
An increase in the severity of the effect of political instability reported decreases the Russian 
speaker’s likelihood to perceive a higher level of corruption by 0.0729, while the likelihood for 
Ukrainian speakers decreases by 0.0803. This implies that if a Russian speaker and a Ukrainian 
speaker perceive there to be the same amount of political instability, the Russian speaker is more 
likely to perceive the government as more corrupt.  
 
V. Analysis 
  Despite reform efforts by Ukrainian citizens such as the Orange Revolution of 2004 and 
the Euromaidan Protest in 2013, Ukraine’s government has been stubbornly ineffective in 
following through on implementing anti-corruption measures (Herbst 2017). The European 
Union has encouraged Ukraine to crackdown on corruption and has asked them to signed an 
Association Agreement.4 This push to end corruption shows that many observers inside and 
outside of Ukraine view corruption as a factor that produces inefficiency, lowers investment, and 
must be reduced to ensure long-term economic growth.  
                                                 
4
 Source: Emmott, Robin. “What is Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU?” Thomas Reuters 27, 





 A rank ordered correlation test using data from BEEPS IV-V shows that Russian 
language and location5 are strongly correlated. Appendix II shows that locations with primarily 
Russian-speaking respondents not surprisingly tended to vote for pro-Russian parliamentary 
candidates. Of the 908 respondents speaking Russian, 555 of them were located where the pro-
Russian “Party of Regions” had won the local 2012 parliamentary election. In comparison, all 
but 5 of the 208 of those who responded in the local language (Ukrainian) were located where 
the pro-European “All-Ukrainian” party won the 2012 parliamentary elections. This data 
supports the decision to use the Russian language variable as a proxy to measure the impact of 
Russian influence.  
The results of this study show that speaking Russian in Ukraine had weak but statistically 
significant effect on perceived corruption. Despite its low marginal significance, there can be 
implications from this result. We can speculate whether speaking Russian in Ukraine leads to 
this effect on perceived corruption due to direct or indirect influences by Russia. 
 Russia has been trying to increase its sphere of influence on some of its former sister 
socialist republics. It has inserted itself into wars with Georgia after the dissolution of the 
U.S.S.R and has illegally annexed Crimea, claiming it was the desire of its people. Russia also 
has a hugely popular pro-government state-run television channel that generally reports on the 
success and good intentions of its foreign policy. Russia has also given former Ukrainian 
President Viktor Yanukovych refuge after his removal as President. This can be interpreted as 
Russia actively protecting its interest within Ukrainian politics. Ukraine’s proximity to Russia 
and its large Russian-speaking population make it a hotbed for nationalists and Russian 
                                                 




sympathizers to dispute the two nations’ place in world affairs. As of 2017, almost 10,000 
Ukrainian civilians have died amongst heavy fighting from the ongoing crisis in eastern Ukraine 
involving Russian-backed separatists trying to secede from Ukraine.6 Russia has provided 
weapons and aid for the rebels fighting against the Ukrainian government and has moved 
thousands of military soldiers onto its borders with Ukraine.7 With Russia inserting itself in so 
many of Ukraine’s national affairs, it is possible that direct actions from Russia may be biasing 
the expectations and perception of the Ukrainian government. 
 Indirectly, Russian values, culture, and expectations may be influencing perceptions as 
well. Those born in Russia or to ethnic Russian families within Ukraine may grow up with 
certain expectations of Russia. For example, a person born in Soviet Russia may remember their 
homeland as a place of power and might, but now resides in a struggling Ukraine. Both 
governments are equally corrupt according to Transparency International, but the expatriate 
experiences Ukraine with a stagnated economy, weak central government, and a weak military. 
This leads to the Russian speaker to speculate as to why Ukraine’s government is ineffective and 
inferior to their expectations. The Russian-speaking respondent may perceive a failed 
government in comparison to Russia.  Perceived corruption is a relative variable and a 
respondent’s expectations are factors that contribute to their interpretation of corruption, and thus 
their perception. In addition to expectations, a respondent’s culture may indirectly influence their 
perception of corruption. Until 2017, the largest social media platform in Ukraine was the 
                                                 
6
 Source: Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine 16 February to 15 May 2017. United  




 Source: Herszenhorn, David M, and Peter Baker. “Russia Steps up Help for Rebels in Ukraine War.” 





Russian version of Facebook called “VKontakte”.8 Social media has become more pervasive and 
intrusive in our daily lives and with a Russian-based platform being the primary one in Ukraine, 
it is possible that Russian-speaking citizens were exposed to biased marketing and information. 
In 2017, the Ukrainian government banned VKontakte amongst other Russian websites for fear 
of direct and indirect propaganda.9 The indirect effect of Russia’s bias on Ukraine may be more 
damaging in the long-term than the direct effects. Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ perception of 
Russia can create divisions in politics, trade, and government as well as in society amongst the 
citizens. 
 This study supports the idea that the indirect effects of Russian influence is stronger than 
the direct effects. This is shown by the marginal results for the percentage of a business foreign-
owned variable. The higher the percentage of a business that is foreign owned, the less likely the 
respondent will perceive corruption at a higher level, meaning the more invested a foreigner is in 
a business, the less corrupt they perceive the government to be. This supports the theory that 
different nationalities or cultures may have different expectations of government. There is a 
question of casualty in this theory. Do foreigners invest in Ukraine because they perceive less 
corruption, or is corruption low because foreigners who are invested perceive it that way?  
Despite the foreign-owned variable having the opposite effect that the Russian variable has on 
perceived corruption, it does lend credence to the idea that a respondent’s previous expectations 
are playing a role. The data does not provide which nationality the owners are from, so it is 
                                                 
8
 Source: Sharkov, Damion. “Ukrainians Join Facebook by the Millions After Russian Social Media Ban.” 
Newsweek, 20 June 2017, www.newsweek.com/ukranians-join-facebook-millions-russian-social-media-ban-627488.  
 
9
 Source: Sharkov, Damion. “Ukrainians Join Facebook by the Millions After Russian Social Media Ban.” 




difficult to extract any specific information about these expectations versus Russian speaker’s 
expectations. A study by Bondarev (2014) uses an earlier BEEPS to determine that foreign-
ownership of a business in Ukraine has a positive link with corruption. Bondarev using an 
instrument to control for endogeneity of foreign-owned business and corruption, determines that 
an increase in foreign-ownership of a business increases the likelihood of higher corruption. His 
study and ours vary in multiple ways including; time frame, control variables, and method of 
testing, all which could attribute to the differing results. However, both studies find that foreign-
ownership is a significant factor in perceiving corruption in Ukraine. 
A struggling nation trying to create stability and economic growth can be easily 
influenced. Both Russia and the EU have attempted to align Ukraine with their respective values. 
This study illustrates the potential impact of Russian culture on perceived corruption. The impact 
Russian speakers have on the perception of the Ukrainian government is important because 
Russian speakers make up a large proportion of the country.  If Ukraine can mitigate the Russian 
influence, it can begin to create its own unbiased perceptions. This could help attract new 
investments and economic aid from European neighbors.  
 It is important to note that the Russian-speaking Ukrainians’ increased likelihood of 
perceiving corruption can have consequences. A respondent's actions may be implicitly affected 
by their perceived corruption. A respondent who feels the government is highly corrupt may be 
less likely to trust or rely on the government to perform its duties. This can impact the economic 
decisions taken by these respondents and have tangible effects on the economy, the government, 




- Limitations of Study 
Firstly, this study uses the BEEPS dataset which, while groundbreaking, still relies on 
self-reporting of illicit activities. Secondly, this study assumes that Russian language is an 
instrument for the influence that Russia is imparting on Ukraine. While it is difficult to 
empirically measure a foreign influence in a country, there may be more than one way to control 
for it. Thirdly, this study does not address endogeneity that the female and foreign ownership 
may have with perceived corruption.  
The scope of this study only examines perceived corruption of respondents who are 
employed. A larger demographic can be used to get more inclusive determination of the factors 
that contribute to perceived corruption. 
While this paper asserts that Russian-speaking Ukrainians are than 2.33% more likely to 
have a higher level of perceived corruption than non-Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the same 
circumstances, its results rely on perceived corruption being a truly accurate proxy for actual 
corruption. Do those respondents influenced by Russia perceive actual corruption differently, 
causing them to report a higher rating of corruption? Or are their perceptions derived from other 
factors that are not related to corruption? The latter is possible if perceived corruption is not an 
accurate proxy for actual corruption.   
Future studies of perceived corruption in Ukraine could add additional elements such as 
merging previous BEEPS datasets together to determine how stock perceived corruption affects 
current perceived corruption. Future research could add other variables such as political 
alignment, permit and licensing effects, and tax administration effects, although they must 
account for endogeneity of those variables.  A more rigorous model can be created with a more 
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detailed dataset including: a variable for the nationality of business owners, reliable 
export/import data, and data of ownership demographics. Further studies on corruption within 
specific countries could yield results showing that corruption is caused by either systematic 
factors, relative factors, or a combination of both. In Ukraine perceived corruption is perpetuated 
by a combination of a relative factor, Russian influence, and common systemic factors such as 
different expectations of foreign-owned business and political instability. Further study on this 
subject could examine if Russian-speaking Ukrainians behave or act differently due to their 
higher likelihood to perceive corruption. Do they make different economic choices? Do they 




The Russian influence on Ukrainian politics is unlikely to dissipate in the near future 
given their history and geography. Ukraine needs to take a variety of steps to ensure economic 
certainty and sustainability, which is not a short-term process. In the short-term however, there 
are actions Ukrainians could take collectively to lessen Russian influence and its effect on 
perceived corruption. For example, Ukrainian politicians should form more stable and concrete 
political parties. Whitmore (2014) notes that before being elected President, Petro Poroshenko 
switched political allegiances four times, one of which was to the pro-Russian Party of Regions. 
With clearly established political parties, Russian-speaking Ukrainians may identify the 
Ukrainian political system as being more stable. Giving more autonomy to the Oblasts, regions 
in Ukraine, would lessen the federal government’s impact on local economies. This might shift 
policies toward ones that are more beneficial to local populations, increasing satisfaction among 
30 
 
those who feel the government is corrupt. Observation of industry and the interactions each 
sector has with the government can provide insight as to why specific industries feel government 
is more corrupt than others. Ukraine has a road map to the European Union if they choose to 
follow the path of Croatia, Bulgaria, and their neighbor Romania. Ukraine’s unique geopolitical 
situation lends extra importance for the need to create a stable and reliable government. Russian-
speaking Ukrainians may always be a part of Ukrainian society and changing their perception on 
corruption may be a hugely difficult task. However, reducing this perceived corruption could be 




































Appendix I: Impact of corruption on day-to-day operations by severity. 
 



































Appendix II: Location of Ukrainian Oblasts (States) and Political Party Elected in 2012 
Parliamentary Elections 
Location         
Capital Kyiv (AU) Kyivska (AU)       








   



































POR- Party of Regions, Pro-Russian 
AU- All-Ukrainian Party, Pro-European 
































Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
   
   
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Dependent Variable  
 






                   2.212925 
 
 
                1.358066 
    Russian Language                    .7522784                 .4318682 
    Industry                    7.435791                   4.53426 
    Relative City Size                    3.193869                   1.12952 
    Female Ownership                           .4217067                  .4940368 
    Foreign Ownership %                     3.75145                 17.02621 
    Business Size                    87.52527                 237.6978 
    Severity of Tax Rate                    2.290804                 1.321756 
    Severity of Instability                   2.333057                 1.385219 

























Table 2: Results from Ordered Logit Regression 
 Corruption 
  












Metal Minerals 0.660** 
 (0.029) 
Basic/Fabricated Metal 0.287 
 (0.449) 




















Size of City -0.0371 
 (0.459) 
Russian Language -0.239* 
 (0.066) 
Female Dummy -0.114 
 (0.312) 
Foreign Ownership % 0.00934*** 
 (0.005) 
  
Firm Size -0.000362 
 (0.115) 
Tax Rate 0.548*** 
 (0.000) 


















p-values in parentheses 










































Table 3: Average Marginal Effects at means of Factor Variables on Corruption Overall, with Russian 
Only, and Local Language Only Using Ordered Logit Regression 




 b/se b/se b/se 
Other Manufacturing 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (.) (.) (.) 
Food -0.0670** -0.0627** -0.0683** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Textile 0.0304 0.0288 0.0309 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Garments -0.0704** -0.0659** -0.0718** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Chemicals -0.1380*** -0.1277*** -0.1412*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Plastic/Rubber 0.0336 0.0318 0.0341 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Metal Minerals -0.0709** -0.0664** -0.0723** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Basic/Fabricated Metal  -0.0329 -0.0309 -0.0335 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Machine & Equipment -0.0533* -0.0500* -0.0543* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Electronics -0.0436 -0.0409 -0.0444 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Construction -0.1084*** -0.1008*** -0.1107*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Other Services -0.0330 -0.0310 -0.0336 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Wholesale -0.1005*** -0.0936*** -0.1026*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
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Retail -0.0722** -0.0676** -0.0736** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Hotel/Restaurant -0.0727 -0.0679 -0.0741 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Transport -0.1548*** -0.1428*** -0.1586*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
IT -0.0683 -0.0639 -0.0696 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Size of City 0.0036 0.0034 0.0037 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Russian Language 0.0233* 0.0217** 0.0239* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female ownership 0.0111 0.0104 0.0114 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Percentage of Foreign 
Ownership 
-0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm Size 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Tax Rate -0.0535*** -0.0497*** -0.0547*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Political Instability -0.0785*** -0.0729*** -0.0803*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
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